UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-26-2019

State v. Smith Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46641

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Smith Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46641" (2019). Not Reported. 5754.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5754

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
6/26/2019 11 :59 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
JUSTIN JAMES SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 46641-2019
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR14-18-12530

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE THOMAS W. WHITNEY
District Judge

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9307
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................ 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 5
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress ............... 5
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ 7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ...................................................................... 5
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ................................................................................... 5
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 1996) .................................................................... 5, 6
State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125 (Ct. App. 2002) .......................................................................... 5
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345 (2013) ........................................................................................ 6
State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584 (Ct. App. 2013) ............................................................................... 5
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................................................................... 6
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1998) ......................................................................... 6
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821 (Ct. App. 2002) ......................................................................... 5
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013) ....................................................................................... 6
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015) ............................................................................................. 6
State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641 (Ct. App. 2008) .......................................................................... 5
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014) ........................................................................................... 5

Statutes
Idaho Code Section 18-8004 ....................................................................................................... 3

Constitutional Provisions
Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17 .............................................................................................................. 5
U.S. Const. amend. IV ................................................................................................................. 5

11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Smith pleaded guilty to one felony count of
driving under the influence. The district court imposed a sentence of eight years, with two years
fixed.

On appeal, mindful that his driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion for the

officer to make the traffic stop, he asserts the district erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June of 2018, the State filed a complaint alleging that Mr. Smith had committed one
felony count of driving under the influence of alcohol, and three related misdemeanors.
(R., pp.11-13.) Mr. Smith waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and the case was bound
over to the district court. (R., pp.23-24.) On the same day, the State filed an Information, and an
Information Part II alleging that Mr. Smith had pled guilty to a felony driving under the
influence charge within the past 15 years. (R., pp.17-22.)
Subsequently, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence, and an affidavit
and memorandum in support of the motion. (R., pp.26-27, 31-38.) In the memorandum, counsel
argued that the officer who stopped Mr. Smith-Sergeant Drinkwine-lacked reasonable
suspicion to make the stop based on his observations that Mr. Smith was allegedly weaving
within his lane of travel and driving ten miles under the speed limit. (R., pp.36-37.) Counsel
argued that the totality of the circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion for the stop
because, among other things, Mr. Smith's driving fell "within the broad range of normal driving
behavior." (R., pp.37-38.)
Sergeant Drinkwine testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. (Tr., p.4, L.11 p.38, L.7.) He said he first noticed Mr. Smith's car because it was "driving slowly for no
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apparent reason.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.10-25.) Specifically, it was travelling approximately 25 miles
per hour in a zone where the posted speed limit was 35. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-14.) He said he
followed Mr. Smith’s car for a “little over a mile” and noticed that it was “weaving within its
lane of travel going from the fog line to the lane divider or yellow line several times.” (Tr., p.12,
Ls.2-12.) He said the car then turned into a subdivision, and he continued up the road but turned
around to see if the car came back out of the subdivision right away. (Tr., p.12, L.20 – p.13,
L.8.) He said that it did, and then it began traveling again in the same direction. (Tr., p.13, Ls.921.) He stated that he followed the car again at that point, and noticed that it was again traveling
approximately 10 miles per hour under the posted speed limit and weaving. (Tr., p.13, Ls.2025.) He testified that the car was not weaving the whole time he followed it, but it “traveled
from the fog line to the centerline numerous times.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-17; see also Tr., p.32,
Ls.12-16.)
Shortly thereafter, the district court ruled on the motion to suppress from the bench.
(Tr., p.44, L.10 – p.53, L.20.) It found that the “numerous weaves combined with the too slow
travel” gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Smith was impaired. (Tr., p.47, Ls.9-12.) It
said that it did not “place any weight” on the fact that Mr. Smith had turned into the subdivision
because he had “every legal right” to do so. (Tr., p.47, Ls.13-24.) Similarly, it stated that the
time of day the events took place had “nothing to do with the court’s analysis of” the case.
(Tr., p.48, Ls.12-21.) It went on to note that this situation was different than the cases defense
counsel cited in support of the motion. Specifically, it said that, because the “weaving occurred
numerous times over a period of a mile,” and Mr. Smith was driving “substantially under the
speed limit,” his driving pattern was “not within the broad range of normal driving . . . .”
(Tr., p.49, Ls.9-19.) Based on these findings, it held Sergeant Drinkwine had an “objective and
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particularized basis to believe that the defendant was committing the crime of driving under the
influence in violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004.” (Tr., p.53, Ls.2-9.) As such, it denied
Mr. Smith’s motion to suppress. (Tr., p.53, Ls.10-14.)
Mr. Smith entered a conditional guilty plea to one felony count of driving under the
influence, which preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. (Tr., p.55, L.20 – p.56, L.6, p.70, Ls.8-20.) Subsequently, the district court imposed a
sentence of eight years, with two years fixed. (R., p.86.) Mr. Smith filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.76-78.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress
Searches or detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129

(Ct. App. 2002).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1

Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right is to "impose a
standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby
safeguard the individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox,
137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
An Idaho traffic stop "constitutes a seizure of the motorist and is therefore subject to Fourth
Amendment strictures, but because it is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an
investigative detention .... " State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653). In order for a traffic stop to comply with the Fourth Amendment's

protections, an officer must have "reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws .... " State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citation omitted).

The reasonableness of the suspicion is evaluated under a totality of the

circumstances test. Id.
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to
suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). The Court will accept "the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the trial court's
application of constitutional principles in light of those facts."

5

Id.

"Determinations of

reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo."

State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013).

Constitutional questions are also reviewed de novo. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 377 (2013).
"While a driving pattern may give rise to reasonable suspicion of intoxication, the test is
whether the driving pattern falls outside 'the broad range of what can be described as normal
driving behavior"' State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 443 (2015) (quoting State v. Emory, 119 Idaho
661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991) (parenthetical omitted)). In Atkinson, the Idaho Court of Appeals held
that a driver's pattern of weaving, in which he never left the lane of travel but touched the lines
on the edges of the lane three separate times, was "not within the range of normal driving
behavior and was an objective indication that the driver was impaired." 128 Idaho at 561; see

also State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding weaving in the lane of travel,
driving ten miles per hour under the speed limit, and crossing the fog line gave rise to reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was driving under the influence).
Mindful of Atkinson and Flowers, Mr. Smith asserts the district erred when it denied his
motion to suppress. He submits that his driving pattern was within the normal range of driving
behavior, and thus Sergeant Drinkwine did not possess reasonable suspicion to make the traffic
stop.

As such, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 26 th day of June, 2019.
/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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